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ABSTRACT

This article discusses antitrust issues present in research and development
collaborations between competitors. In particular, it illustrates that, although often
very beneficial, these collaborations may have the potential for considerable harm via
suppression of innovation.
The article examines a recent case involving a
collaboration to develop drugs, which arguably resulted in the suppression of a
promising drug.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1998, a symposium was convened to discuss a particular issue in the much
debated "conflict" or "tension" between intellectual property and antitrust: the
suppression of technology. 1 Defining "suppression of technology" as "any type of
conduct or agreement that limits the availability, use, or development of a particular
process or product, or that limits or chills the ability of others to create or exploit
such an innovative process or product," 2 the participants evaluated the implications
of technology suppression from an antitrust perspective. This article seeks to add to
that discourse by examining a particular area which I believe has considerable
potential for suppression:
research and development ("R&D") collaborations.
However, this article proceeds not by an extensive analysis of law, economics, or
policy, but by providing and evaluating an actual example where suppression
occurred. Specifically, this article discusses and analyzes antitrust concerns raised
by a collaboration of three firms for the development and commercialization of antiIgE antibodies. 3 The article focuses on the firms' ten year dispute over rights to
develop these antibodies, which resulted in the abandonment of a drug which had
promising results in clinical trials for the treatment of peanut allergies. 4 The drug
was abandoned because two of the firms in the collaboration refused to allow the
third firm to independently develop the drug, fearing that the drug would compete
with a new drug developed by the collaboration-a drug developed for treating
asthma.5 The case is exceptional not only because the collaboration's actions resulted
in less potential competition and the abandonment of a promising drug, but also
because it involves several notable issues in the patent-antitrust intersection. Part I
of this article lays out the relevant facts of the case. Part II provides a brief
introduction to antitrust law, focusing on those issues most pertinent to the facts.
Part III examines the primary antitrust issues raised by the collaboration. Finally,
Part IV concludes with my belief that competitive concerns raised by the

- Member, State Bar of California, New York; Candidate for Master of Laws, Trade Regulation
(Antitrust), New York University, May 2006. I would like to thank David Hamilton of the Wall
Street Journalfor bringing this case to my attention. See David Hamilton, Silent Treatment: How
Genentech, Novartis Stifled a PromisingDrug; WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2005, at Al.
1 All articles submitted in the symposium were subsequently published in Volume 66 of the
Antitrust Law Journal,beginning at page 421. Joel M. Cohen & Arthur J. Burke, An Overview of
the AntitrustAnalysis of Suppression of Technology 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 421, 424 (1998).
2 1d.

3 The collaboration occurred between Tanox, Novartis, and Genentech. See Hamilton, supra
note *, at Al.
4 See Hamilton, supra note *, at Al.
5 See Hamilton, supra note *, at Al.
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collaboration are sufficiently troubling to warrant presumptive condemnation under
antitrust law.
For the purpose of accuracy, and in fairness to the firms involved in the
collaboration examined herein, a few brief disclaimers should be made. First, all the
"facts" provided below were taken from public documents and primarily from court
records in one particular case involving the collaborators. 6 As a result, the asserted
facts amount to my interpretation of all purported facts, statements, assertions, and
documents included in the public record. 7 Second, for the sake of simplicity, brevity,
and relevance, this article only discusses events which involve antitrust issues.
Consequently, certain facts are oversimplified or even omitted.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

Novartis and Genentech are large pharmaceutical companies that, among other
activities, develop and commercialize drugs.8 Genentech is based in San Francisco,
CA, while Novartis is based in Basel, Switzerland. 9 Tanox is a Houston, TX
biotechnology company specializing in the discovery and development of
biotherapeutics based on monoclonal antibody technology. 10 Created in 1986, Tanox
is a relatively small company whose first and only commercialized drug (as of
December 2005) is XOLAIR, which was developed in collaboration with Genentech
and Novartis. XOLAIR was approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration
("FDA") in 2003 for the treatment of asthma in adults and adolescents.1 1

6 Other notable sources of public information include the companies' own websites and annual
reports submitted by the companies to the Securities & Exchange Commission ('SEC").
7 I viewed all public filings including pleadings, orders, and decisions in the case at the court
house in San Francisco, CA on two consecutive days in June 2005. Despite taking notes and copying
over 350 pages of the most pertinent documents, I cannot attest to the complete accuracy of all facts.
Moreover, several of the documents and pleadings provided by Genentech and Novartis were
redacted, while others were sealed.
8 Novartis-A World Leader in Pharmaceuticals,
http://www.novartis.com/about novartis/en/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 23, 2006); Genentech-A
Biotech Research and Information Company, http://www.gene.com/gene/about/index.jsp?ei=utf
8&fr=slvl-&p=genentech (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).
9
Genentech:
About
Us-Our
Locations,
http://www.gene.com/gene/about/locations/index.jsp?ei=utf-8&fr=slv1-&p=genentech
(indicating
where the corporate headquarters are for Genentech) (last visited Apr. 23, 2006); Introduction
History-Novartis.com, http://www.novartis.com/about novartis/en/history.shtml (indicating where
the headquarters are for Novartis) (last visited Apr. 23, 2006). Novartis was formed in late 1996 as
a result of a merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz. Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts
2,
Genentech, Inc. v. Tanox, Inc., No. 99-2060 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2001). Novartis is the successor-ininterest to all of Ciba's pharmaceutical business including all of Ciba's rights and obligations under
the agreements discussed in this article. Id. Accordingly, for purposes of simplicity, I will refer to
Novartis instead of Ciba-Geigy even when referring to actions and events occurring prior to the
merger.
10Tanox-Home, http://www.tanox.com/home/home.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).
11 Tanox, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 3 (Mar. 10, 2005), availablo at
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=120940&p=irol-sec [hereinafter Annual Report]; see also
Tanox XOLAIR, http://www.tanox.com/products/xolair.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
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In the 1980s, Tanox developed certain anti-Immunoglobulin E ("anti-IgE")
monoclonal antibodies for which it filed a patent. 12 Anti-IgE antibodies are
genetically engineered antibodies that target specific antigens in the body for the
treatment of immune-mediated diseases, infectious diseases, inflammation, and
cancer. 13
In 1989, Tanox sought to develop and commercialize its anti-IgE
antibodies, and entered into confidential discussions with large, well-financed, and
experienced companies, including Genentech and Novartis, to discuss potential
collaborations in furtherance thereof. 14 Although Genentech and Tanox discussed a
potential collaboration, an agreement was not reached. 15 Instead, in 1990, Tanox
entered into a collaborative agreement with Novartis, called the Development &
Licensing Agreement ("D&L Agreement"), for the joint development and
commercialization of anti-IgE antibody products. 16 Of particular relevance to the
parties' future relationship (and this article) is that under the terms of the D&L
Agreement, Tanox had certain rights to develop, independent of the collaboration,
any antibody product that Novartis believed was "not sufficiently superior" to justify
17
clinical development under the Tanox-Novartis collaboration.

12 Defendant Tanox Inc.'s Memorandum In Support of Its Motion For Preliminary Injunction
and Notice of Motion 5, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (May 15, 1999).
13 "The term IgE refers to a particular class of naturally occurring human immunoglobin,
which is part of the human immune system. Anti-IgE Antibodies refers to a class of molecules that
bind to or inhibit the effect of IgE." Genentech's Opposition to Tanox's Motion To Lift Stay of
Arbitration at n.1, Genentech,No. 99-2060 (Aug. 14, 2000).
11Declaration of Dr. Nancy Chang In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
7 2-3, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Sept. 18, 2001); see also Annual Report, supra note 11, at 10
(stating "We chose to enter into the collaboration agreements with Novartis and Genentech, in part,
to secure the benefit of their experience in these areas, as well as the contribution of their greater
financial resources.").
15 Although none of the parties address the 1989-1990 negotiations in any detail, it is
significant that the record suggests that, as early as 1989, discussions occurred between Tanox and
Genentech wherein Tanox expressed its desire to have independent development rights in any
collaboration. Soo Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts
26, Genentoch, No. 99-2060 (Mar. 14,

2001).
16 Id.
6.
17 Specifically, paragraph 5 of Annex 3 of the D&L Agreement provides:
If Tanox desires to pursue development of any Product(s) within the Field, in
addition to Product(s) already being developed hereunder, which Ciba-Geigy
believes is not sufficiently superior to justify a simultaneous clinical development
program, then Tanox itself, without giving rights to any Third Party, will have the
right to pursue development of such Product(s) at its sole expense; subject,
however, to the right of first refusal of Ciba-Geigy to license the Product(s) as
provided under Paragraph 11 of this Agreement.
Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts
9, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Mar. 14, 2001). It is worth
pointing out that the existence of Tanox's independent development rights under the D&L
Agreement was not disputed.
Id. Rather, the scope and extent of those rights and whether such
rights were modified, preempted, or extinguished by subsequent agreements was the primary point
of contention among the parties. Id.
31, 32; see also Tanox's Motion for Summary Judgment at
3-8, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment
Regarding Contract Issues at 7-12, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Plaintiff Novartis
Pharma Ag's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof at 1419, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
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By the early to mid-1990's, the Tanox-Novartis collaboration identified and
synthesized two anti-lgE antibodies, designated as CGP 56901 and CGP 51901.18
The former showed promise in the treatment of peanut allergies (for which it later
underwent clinical trials).19 At the same time, Genentech was developing its own
anti-IgE antibodies, E25 and E26.20 E25 has since obtained the trade name
21
"XOLAIR," and has been approved, marketed, and sold for the treatment of asthma.
In 1993, Genentech approached Novartis and Tanox regarding acquiring
Novartis's interest in the Tanox-Novartis collaboration.2 2 Although Novartis and
23
Genentech reached an agreement, Tanox and Genentech were unable to do so.
Correspondence between Tanox and Genentech during this time period reveals that
the failure of the parties to reach an agreement was in significant part a result of
Tanox's refusal to relinquish its independent development rights under the D&L
24
Agreement absent considerable compensation.
In late 1993, shortly after Genentech's unsuccessful efforts to purchase
Novartis's interest in the Tanox-Novartis collaboration, Tanox sued Genentech and

18Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts, Genentech, No. 99-2060

19 (Mar. 14, 2001).

1)See Hamilton, supra note *, at Al.
20 Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts
9, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Mar. 14, 2001). Note,
however, that the parties did not agree as to whether Genentech was independently developing its
own anti-IgE antibody at any time prior to the Tanox-Novartis-Genentech collaboration. Compare
Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 4, Gonentoeh, No. 992060 (Feb. 28, 2001), with Tanox's Answer to Complaint
10, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28,
2001); see also Complaint of Tanox, Tanox Biosystems v. Genentech, No. H.94-0189 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(Tanox alleging, inter alia,that Genentech used confidential information obtained in the 1989-1990
negotiations with Tanox to develop a competing antibody).
21 Asthma Treatment: Xolair.com, http://www.xolair.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
22 Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 4-5, Genentech,
No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment at 1, Genentech, No. 99-2060
(Feb. 28, 2001).
23 Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 4-5, Genentech,
No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment at 1, Genentech, No. 99-2060
(Feb. 28, 2001).
24 See Letter from David Anderson, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Tanox,
Inc., to John Mclaughlin, Senior Vice President, Genentech (Nov. 29, 1993) (informing Genentech
that "Tanox would be willing to give up its parallel development rights in exchange for an agreed
cash payment"); Response Letter from John Mclaughlin to David Anderson (Dec. 8, 1993) (offering to
increase royalties in exchange for limiting Tanox's independent development rights). Both letters
were provided to the court. Exhibits in Declaration of Rita A. Hao In Support Of Genentech's
Motion For Summary Judgment In Regards to Contract Issues, Genentoeh, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28,
2001); see also Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 6,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
Genentech dismissed Tanox's suggestion that Genentech and Tanox form a
collaboration with independent development rights for Tanox....
Tanox
responded that it would be willing to "give up" its independent development rights
under the D&L Agreement if Genentech paid Tanox $85 million over five years.
Genentech was unwilling to pay such a massive sum. Nor was Genentech willing
to enter into a collaboration in which it might have to compete with its supposed
collaborator.
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others in a Texas federal court, alleging fraud and misappropriation. 25 Tanox
alleged, inter alia, that Genentech unlawfully used confidential information and
samples provided by Tanox during the 1989 negotiations regarding a potential
collaboration to develop a competing antibody. 26 In addition, Tanox alleged that
Genentech obtained exclusive rights to third party patents in the field of IgEmediated diseases, which were important for producing antibodies in
commercializing quantities, for the sole purpose of hindering Tanox from
commercializing its antibodies. 27 In 1994, Genentech countersued Tanox and
Novartis claiming that the collaboration's development of anti-IgE antibodies
28
infringed some of Genentech's patents.
In 1996, after more than two years of litigation, the parties settled the matter by
agreeing to collaborate and the cases were dismissed. 29 Three settlement agreements
("Agreements") were signed on July 8, 1996: (1) a tripartite agreement, called the
"Outline of Terms," wherein the parties agreed to "merge" their respective
independent anti-IgE antibody development projects, jointly develop anti-IgE
antibodies, and provide each other with royalty free cross licenses for all patents; (2)
a bilateral agreement between Tanox and Novartis, called the "Supplemental
Agreement;" and (3) a bilateral agreement between Genentech and Tanox called the
"Settlement and Cross-Licensing Agreement." 30 The Agreements modified certain
25 Roche Holdings and Hoffman-La Roche were also named defendants in the lawsuit as a
result of Roche's majority ownership position in Genentech at the time the lawsuit was filed. Tanox
Biosystems v. Genentech, No. H.94-0189 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
26 Id.
A copy of the Complaint was provided as an exhibit to Chang's Declaration. Declaration
of Dr. Nancy Chang In Support of Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment, Genentech, No. 99-2060
(Feb. 28, 2001).
27 Tanox, No. H.94-0189 (S.D.Texas.1993).
Because this allegation is never raised in the
California litigation, I do not address it. However, if true, such conduct raises considerable antitrust
issues.
28 Plaintiffs Notice Of Motion & Motion To Permanently Stay Arbitration Memorandum of
Points and Authorities In Support Thereof at 3, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Apr. 29, 1999). The cases
were later consolidated for trial. Id.
21)Plaintiffs Notice Of Motion & Motion To Permanently Stay Arbitration Genentech, No. 992060 (Apr. 29, 1999); soo ao Plaintiff Novartis AG's Memorandum of Points and Authorities In
Opposition To Defendant Tanox's Motion To Lift Stay Of Arbitration at 3, Genentech, No. 99-2060
(Aug. 14, 2000).; Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment at 4-5, Genenteh, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28,

2001).
30Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment at 4-5, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
Although not intended to be a final, integrated contract, the Outline of Terms was binding on all
parties. Paragraph 13 of The Outline of Terms provides:
13. Binding Nature
The contents of this Outline of Terms represents the bona fide intent of the parties.
The parties hereto shall use all reasonable effort to complete the final agreement(s) as
referred to in Section 8.2 above as soon as reasonably practicable. It is understood,
however, that unless and until the said formal agreement(s) is/are completed and entered
into the parties (including their legal successors) shall be legally bound by and shall
operate under the terms reflected in the present Outline of Terms, which shall be
governed by the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict of law
principles.
Although the Outline of Terms was intended to be supplanted by a more definite, detailed
agreement, such an agreement was never made. No party disputes the binding nature of the
Outline of Terms. See Genentech's Opposition To Tanox's Motion To Lift Stay Of Arbitration at 3-4,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Aug. 14, 2000); Tanox, Inc's Answer To Complaint For Declaratory Relief,
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rights and obligations under the D&L Agreement and created new ones (particularly
as to Genentech, which was not a party to the D&L Agreement), but, significantly,
did not alter Tanox's independent developments rights. 31
Structurally, the
Agreements essentially created a joint venture between the parties to develop and
commercialize one or more of the four anti-lgE antibodies previously identified and
synthesized by the parties. 32 Under the Outline of Terms, the existing anti-lgE
projects of both Genentech and the Tanox-Novartis collaboration-which included
33
E25, E26, CGP 56901, and CGP 51901-would merge into a single project.
However, notwithstanding the merger of projects, the parties were required to
34
continue to take their respective projects through the FDA Phase II clinical trials.

Based on the results of the trials, the parties were to jointly decide, via a "Steering
Committee" comprised of all three parties, which of the antibodies would be
developed. 35 Thereafter, Novartis and Genentech had the principal obligation for
developing, obtaining approval, and commercializing the chosen antibodies (including

Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant Of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Unfair
Competition and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
13, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (May 10, 1999).
'3' Memorandum and Order, Genenteh, No. 99-2060 (Oct. 9, 2001) (finding, inter alia, that
Tanox ".... retained independent development rights under the D&L Agreement after signing the
Outline of Terms" and that ". . . the Outline of Terms permits Tanox's use of confidential
information in the process of developing rejected antibodies"). In so holding, the Court rejected
Novartis and Genentech's argument that provisions of the Outline of Terms, Supplemental
Agreement, or Settlement and Cross-Licensing Agreement either expressly or implicitly negated
Tanox's independent development rights. Id.; see Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment
Regarding Contract Issues at 11-22, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Plaintiff Novartis
Pharma Ag's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum In Support Thereof at 1122, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
32 See Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Contract issues at 11-22, Genentech,
No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
3 A copy of the signed Outline of Terms was provided as an Exhibit to Declaration of Dr.
Nancy Chang In Support of Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment (Feb. 28, 2001), Genentech, 992060 (Feb. 28, 2001). For purposes of this article, Paragraphs 1 is probably the most significant, and
provides:
1. Merger of Anti-IgE Projects
The anti-IgE -antibody projects of Genentech on the one side and Ciba/Tanox on
the other side shall be merged, but Genentech and Ciba/Tanox will continue to
take their respective anti-IgE antibodies through Phase II clinical trials currently
in progress or planned to be performed during 1996. Based upon the results of
these trials and other relevant considerations, Genentech, Tanox, and Ciba shall
jointly discuss and decide by June 1, 1997 at the latest which of the antiIgE
antibodies shall be taken up in Phase III trials, be developed for additional
indications (if any), be submitted for marketing authorization and be
commercialized as a pharmaceutical product (anti-IgE Product").
The final
Agreement(s) as referred to in Section 8.2 shall provide for procedures in case of a
disagreement between the parties. All development activities shall be supervised
by a Steering Committee on which each party is represented. The merging of
each
party's
anti-IgE-antibody
project
and
the
development
and
commercialization thereof according to this Outline of Terms shall extend to all
IgE inhibiting antibodies (including fractions or derivatives thereof) which have
been identified and synthesized by either party hereto before July 1, 1996.
Id.
M Id.
35 Id.
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36
absorbing nearly all of the costs), with Tanox having a substantially limited role.
Because the collaboration required sharing of confidential information, the Outline of
Terms prohibited disclosure or use of confidential information disclosed in the
context of the collaboration's selection, development, or commercialization of the
antibody product for any purpose "other than those contemplated under the Outline
of Terms." 37 As a final word regarding the 1996 settlement, it is worth mentioning
that no provision in any of the Agreements addressed independent development
rights despite independent development rights being a material reason for the
failures of both the 1989 and 1993 collaborative negotiations between Genentech and
38
Tanox.
During the summer of 1997, the Steering Committee selected the two molecules
synthesized by Genentech for further development and commercialization. 39 In
addition, it decided that the two molecules developed by the Tanox-Novartis
collaboration would no longer be developed. 40 Because the collaboration chose not to
develop CGP 56901, and based upon its belief that there was a significant market for
36 It appears that Tanox's obligations in the collaboration was primarily limited to licensing its
patent rights. In contrast, its rights under the Agreements included limited commercialization and
manufacturing rights, and substantial milestone payments and royalties. See, e.g., Outline of
Terms
2-5, Supplemental Agreement 1, Settlement & Cross-Licensing Agreement, attached to
Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support Of Defendant Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
37 Paragraph 10.1 of the Outline of Terms provides:
Any information and data disclosed by a party to another party hereto (the
'Receiving Party') in the context of the selection, development, and
commercialization of the anti-IgE Product shall be kept strictly confidential by the
Receiving Party, shall not be disclosed to any third party by the Receiving Party
and shall not be used by the Receiving Party for any purpose other than those
contemplated under this Outline of Terms.
Outline of Terms
10 attached to Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support Of Defendant Tanox's
Motion For Summary Judgment, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001). Novartis and Genentech
argued that this provision prohibited Tanox from using confidential information obtained via the
collaboration in its independent development of CGP 56901. Genentech's Opposition To Tanox's
Motion For a Preliminary Injunction at 9-10, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001) (Sept. 10,
2001).
38The record is not entirely clear regarding the extent of settlement negotiations pertaining to
Tanox's independent development rights. The parties assert that no negotiations were held on
independent development rights. See Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment at 5, Genen teeh, No.
99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts
26, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb.
28, 2001). However, the parties also acknowledge that several drafts of the Outline of Terms were
circulated, some of which made explicit references to Tanox's rights under the D&L Agreement
(which would include any independent development rights included therein). Joint Statement of
Undisputed Facts
17-19, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); Genentech's Motion For
Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 9-10, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
'9 Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts
29, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); see also
Minutes from Genentech-Tanox-Ciba Anti-IgE Joint Steering Committee (Oct. 18, 1996) attached to
Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support of Defendant Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001) (Wherein the Steering Committee accepts the
recommendation to select XOLAIR for further development, but agrees with the recommendation for
"manufacturing and clinical programs for CGP 56901 until Q2 '97 as a back-up plan if it is necessary
to switch back to CGP 56901".).
40 See Letter from Dr. Herbert Gut, Novartis, to David Anderson, Tanox, (Sept. 20, 1997)
attached to Declaration of Rita Hao In Support of Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment
Regarding Contract Issues, Genentech,No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
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an anti-IgE antibody product for the treatment of peanut allergies, Tanox began to
independently develop CGP 56901-a right Tanox believed it had under the D&L
Agreement and retained after signing the Agreements. 41 Genentech and Novartis,
however, disapproved, and strongly contested that Tanox had any right to develop
CGP 56901 outside of the collaboration. 42 For over a year the parties negotiated in
an attempt to resolve their disputes over Tanox's rights to independently develop
CGP 56901. Tanox also sought mediation and arbitration pursuant to dispute
resolution provisions in the D&L Agreement and Settlement & Cross-Licensing
Agreement.43 However, in April 1999, shortly after Tanox filed for arbitration,
Genentech and Novartis filed a lawsuit in federal district court in San Francisco to
cease Tanox's development and commercialization of CGP 56901. 44 In addition,
Tanox explains its reason for independent development of CGP 56901:
As indicated in our Demand for Arbitration, especially on pages 10 and 13, Tanox
has tried regularly to convey its intentions for the exercising of its independent
development rights. As you by now should be well aware, we are pursuing clinical
development activities in patients allergic to peanuts. We continue to have an
interest in the area of atopic dermatitis as we previously stated, and to the extent
permitted by the express terms of our agreement as determined in our arbitration
proceedings, we will continue to look for other areas where Novartis and
Genentech have not shown sufficient commitment to development and
commercialization to persuade us that our efforts are either unnecessary or not
cost effective. As we have repeatedly stressed, we believe the market for anti-IgE
antibodies is far greater than suggested by Novartis' market assessments and
what we believe to be its inadequate commitment to product supply.
Letter from David Anderson, Tanox, to Dr. Herbert Gut, Novartis (Apr. 29, 1999). From 1999-2002,
Tanox conducted clinical trials of CGP 56901 for use against peanut allergies. According to a study
published in the March 13, 2003 edition of the New England Journal of Medicine, the trials were
promising, with all patients on the drug showing a decrease in their IgE levels at the end of the
study. See Anti-IgE Therapy Update, http://www.foodallergy.org/Research/antiigetherapy.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2006).
42 CGP 56901, the back-up molecule that Tanox is now unilaterally developing, was
identified before July 1, 1996, and is therefore subject to the exclusive supervision
of the steering committee established by the Outline of Terms. Accordingly,
Tanox has no right to develop CGP 56901 by itself, having given up that right in
exchange for a sizable sum of money; assistance in research, development, and
marketing of its products; and continuing royalty rights in any product developed
by the three-way collaboration of the companies.
Genentech's Motion For Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 2, Genentech, No. 992060 (Feb. 28, 2001); see also Genentech-Novartis-Tanox Joint Steering Committee Anti IgE
Minutes (Aug. 14, 1997) attached to Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support of Tanox's Reply In
Support Its Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001) (Wherein
Genentech and Novartis dispute Tanox's claimed independent development rights.).
43 Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support of Tanox's Reply In Support of Its Motion For
Preliminary Injunction at Ex. 6, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Sept. 18, 2001) (requesting mediation in a
January 29, 1999 letter from Jeffrey Parson, Esq., Outside Counsel for Tanox, to Dana Haviland,
Outside Counsel for Genentech, and Genentech's Feb. 8, 1999 response, denying the request). In
February 1999, Tanox filed a demand for arbitration against Novartis. Genentech's Opposition to
tanox's Motion to Lift Stay of Arbitration at 3, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Aug. 14, 2000). In July
1999, Tanox filed for arbitration against Genentech. Id.
44 Memorandum and Order at 1, 11, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Oct. 9, 2001). The Complaint
was filed on April 29, 1999. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, Unfair Competition and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets at 1, Genentech,
No. 99-2060 (Apr. 29, 1999). By order of the Court on September 3, 1999, the arbitration was stayed
41
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Tanox was informed that it would be unable to attend meetings of the Steering
Committee or have access to confidential information regarding the development of
XOLAIR unless it agreed that any information it obtained from the collaboration
45
would not be used in its development of a competing drug.
The primary substantive issues disputed in the lawsuit were the existence and
scope of Tanox's rights to independently develop CGP 56901 and its use of
confidential information obtained in the collaboration. 46 Tanox asserted that both its
right to independent development of CGP 56901 and to use information obtained
from the collaboration in its development of CGP 56901 were expressly provided for
47
in the D&L Agreement, and that these rights were unaltered by the Agreements.
In contrast, Genentech and Novartis averred that Tanox's independent development
rights under the D&L Agreement were far more limited than Tanox claimed, and
moreover, were "extinguished" or "preempted" by the Agreements. 48 Genentech also
argued that Tanox's used confidential information that it obtained from the
collaboration, thus not only violating the confidentiality provision of the Outline of
49
Terms, but also constituting trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition.
50
No antitrust claims were raised in the lawsuit.
After several years of litigation and an unsuccessful court ordered mediation,
the district court held that the Agreements did not extinguish Tanox's independent
development rights under the D&L Agreement, and held that Tanox had the right to
and mediation was ordered. Memorandum and Order at 1, 11, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Oct. 9,
2001). By order of the Court on October 9, 2001, the stay was lifted. Id.
1
Defendant Tanox Inc.'s Memorandum In Support of Its Motion For Preliminary Injunction
and Notice of Motion at 7, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Aug. 15, 2001); see also Declaration of Nancy
Chang In Support Of Defendant Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment, Genenteh, No. 99-2060
(Feb. 28, 2001) (regarding a letter from David Anderson, Tanox, to Dr. Herbert Gut and Dr. Djordje,
Novartis, dated September 10, 1999 about Novartis's refusal to permit Tanox to attend the Steering
Committee meetings or have access to confidential information, and regarding the response from Dr.
Gut dated September 14, 1999).
46 Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 3, Genentech,No.
99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
47 Defendant Tanox's Opposition to Genetech's Motion for Summary Judgment in Regard to
Contract Issues at 2, Genentoh, No. 99-2060 (Mar. 14, 2001).
48 Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 2, Genentech, No.
99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
49 Genentech's Opposition To Tanox's Motion To Lift Stay of Arbitration at 4-5, Genentech,
No. 99-2060 (Aug. 14, 2000); Genentech's Opposition To Tanox's Motion For A Preliminary
Injunction at 10-11, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Sept. 10, 2001) (arguing that the confidential
information Plaintiffs were trying to protect were trade secrets, which they are required by law to
protect or forfeit, and which Defendant misappropriated).
50 Defendant Tanox's Opposition to Genetech's Motion for Summary Judgment in Regard to
Contract Issues at 10, Gonentech, No. 99-2060 (Mar. 14, 2001). In fact, the only statement found
regarding antitrust liability during the entire litigation was the following brief statement by Tanox:
It was not the intent of this collaborative effort to stifle competition but, rather, to jointly
develop a novel therapeutic treatment and thereby share the risk inherent in developing new
pharmaceuticals. One of the lead negotiators for Novartis privately expressed the view that
competition with a jointly developed anti-IgE product might enhance the market and benefit
all. Even when the agreements were signed on July 8, 1996, the parties were clearly permitted
to compete with the new collaboration as antibodies identified after July 1, 1996 (a week before
the agreements were signed) were not even candidates or joint development by the
collaboration.
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use confidential information obtained from the collaboration in the development of
antibodies rejected by the collaboration. 51 However, the court also declared that the
extent and scope of Tanox's independent rights, in particular whether such rights
encompassed development of CGP 56901 outside of the collaboration, were subject to
arbitration. 52 On February 25, 2004, after an arbitrator ruled against Tanox's right
to independently develop CGP 56901, the parties settled the case. 53 As a result of the
settlement, Tanox ceased developing CGP 56901 and gave up certain rights it had
under the Agreements (most substantially, all manufacturing rights) in exchange for
increased royalties, milestone payments, a one time $6.6 million dollar payment to
cover a portion of the development costs of CGP 56901, and loan forgiveness from
Novartis worth over $10 million dollars. 54 In addition, after the settlement, the
collaboration announced that it would test XOLAIR for use against peanut
allergies. 55 The Phase II clinical trials began in June 2004, but were terminated in
January 2006 because of purported safety concerns with the allergy test used in the
trials. 56 As a result, it is likely that obtaining FDA approval for use of XOLAIR in
57
treating allergies remains years away.
At least 1.5 million people living in the United States have nut allergies, and
some can die within minutes if accidentally exposed. 58 According to a study
published in the December 2003 Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology, the
number of reported peanut allergies in children doubled between 1997 and 2002 from
59
.4% to .8%.

51 Memorandum and Order, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Oct. 9, 2001) (granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment).
52 Memorandum and Order at 11, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Oct. 9, 2001) (granting defendant's
motion to lift stay of arbitration); see also Transcripts of Hearing, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Dec. 10,
2001) (clarifying the Court's Oct. 9, 2001 Order and staying all legal proceedings pending
arbitration).
53 Annual Report, supra note 11, at 35. On February 25, 2004, the parties entered into a new
agreement, the Tripartite Collaboration Agreement, "to settle all then outstanding litigation and
arbitrations among the parties and to finalize the detailed terms of the three-party collaborations."
Id. A stipulation for voluntary dismissal was submitted to the court on February 27, 2004, and on
March 5, 2004, by order of the Court, the case was dismissed. Unfortunately, the February 25, 2004
settlement agreement was not provided in the record, or otherwise publicly disclosed, so its terms
are unknown to the author.
54 See Annual Report, supra note 11, at 6-7, 32, 35; see also Novartis, Genentech, and Tanox
settle
dispute
surrounding
Xolair
and
TNX-901,
http://dominoext.novartis.com/NC/NCMediaRel9798.nsf/0/49f369fb4l5e l36ec1256f800042lb40/$FIL
E/PR%/o20XOLAIR%/o20Settlemento2026.02.04.pdf (Feb. 26, 2003) (announcing the settlement).
5, Novartis, Genentech, and Tanox settle dispute surrounding Xolair and TNX-901,
http://dominoext.novartis.com/NC/NCMediaRel9798.nsf/0/49f369fb4l5e136ecl256f80042lb40/$FIL
E/PRo20XOLAIRo2OSettlemento2026.02.04.pdf (Feb. 26, 2003).
56 See Annual Report, supra note 11, at 4; David Hamilton, Genentech Stops Trial on
Concerns over Safety ofPeanutAllergy Test, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2006.
57 Hamilton, supranote 56.
58 The Food Allergy and Anaphylaxis Network, http://www.foodallergy.org/whatsnew.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2006); Hamilton, supra note *, at Al.
, 9Study Confirms What Doctors and Parents Have Suspected: Peanut Allergies in Children
Have Doubled in the Last Five Years Food Allergies and Anaphylaxis Network Seeks Higher
Standards
of
Care,
http ://allergies.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi= /XJ&sdn=allergies&zu=http %3A /2F /o2Fwww
.foodallergy.org%2Fpress releases%2Fprevalence.html (Dec. 9, 2003).
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II.

ANTITRUST LAW

This article examines anticompetitive concerns presented by the NovartisGenentech-Tanox relationship and particularly, resulting from the tripartite
collaboration. As a matter of policy, competition in markets is generally considered
desirable for the following reasons: (1) competition tends to lead to increased output
and decreased prices, benefiting consumers; (2) competition generally results in
increased allocative and productive efficiency; (3) competition tends to create
incentives to innovate; and (4) in industries where firms produce differentiated
goods, competition tends to lead to enhanced variety. 60 In the United States, the
principle statutory basis for regulating conduct which harms competition is the
Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act").61 Accordingly, this section will begin with a
brief overview of the Sherman Act, followed by a more detailed antitrust analysis of
issues particularly relevant to this article:
collaboration among competitors,
settlement of patents disputes, and the acquisition and non-use of patents.

A. The Sherman AntitrustAct: A Basic Overview
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agreements or other joint firm conduct
which "unreasonably" restrains trade. 62 Case law has interpreted the reasonableness
63
criteria as assessing the effect of the challenged conduct on competition.
Consequently, when determining whether any particular conduct unreasonably
restrains trade, courts and enforcement agencies generally examine and weigh the
anticompetitive effects of the conduct against all genuine pro-competitive
justifications. 64 This inquiry, termed the "rule of reason" in antitrust parlance, is
60 LAWRENCE SULLIVAN & WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:
AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK, § 1.5(b) (2000); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield
the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
N. Pae. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4; see also The UK's Department of Industry's July 2001 White Paper,
Productivity and Enterprise:
A World Class Competition Regime § 1.1, availahble at
http://www.archive.official- documents .co.uk/document/cm52/5233/523304.htm
("Vigorous
competition between firms is the lifeblood of strong and effective markets. Competition helps
consumers get a good deal. It encourages firms to innovate by reducing slack, putting downward
pressure on costs and providing incentives for the efficient organisation of production.").
61 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 etseq. (2000).
62 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 1 provides in part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id.
Despite its broad prohibitive terms, it has long been held that Section 1 only condemns
"unreasonable" restraints. See, e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911).
63 Standard Oil,221 U.S. at 87.
(34Id.

[5:348 2006]

Antitrust Analysis of a Research & Development Collaboration

359

both flexible and fact specific, and usually requires an assessment of the relevant
industry, the firms involved in the litigation, the nature of the restraint, the valid
pro-competitive justifications for the restraint (e.g. efficiencies), and the actual and
likely effects of the restraint on both the industry (which includes potential entrants
as well as current firms) and consumers. 65 Because this analysis is extensive, costly,
and time consuming, courts have articulated circumstances when the analysis can be
truncated or even obviated. 66 For example, it has long been held that certain types of
conduct are so likely to be harmful to competition and to have no significant procompetitive benefit that such conduct may be condemned outright, and held to be per
se illegal without any assessment of particular effects. 67 Alternatively, conduct that
is not deemed per se illegal but nevertheless "appears likely, absent an efficiency
justification, to restrict competition and decrease output" may be presumed to be
unreasonable without a detailed market analysis, although such presumption is
rebuttable upon plausible and legally cognizable pro-competitive justification(s) for
68
the conduct.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes "monopolization" and attempted
monopolization. 69 Monopolization has two elements: "(i) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident." 70 Various types of conduct may fall
within the ambit of monopolization including predation (price and non-price), price
71
squeezing, tying, bundling, exclusive dealings, and refusals to deal.
Although distinct, both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act attempt to
72
regulate conduct which is likely to harm competition and, ultimately, consumers.
(5 See WILLIAM HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK

§ 2.10 (2006 Ed.).

66 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
67 Id. "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without any elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." Id.; see also FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm

(issued jointly by

the

Federal

Trade

Commission and Department of Justice). The most common types of per se illegal acts are price
fixing, bid rigging, and market allocations. Id.
(38Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This type of analysis is
generally termed a "quick look" analysis. See also, California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756
(1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
(39Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Id.
70 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71(1966).
71 JULIAN VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION: DESK EDITION

§ 3.02(3) (2d ed.).
72 It is fairly well established in modern U.S. antitrust jurisprudence that for conduct to be
"anticompetitive," it must adversely affect consumers; that is, the conduct will result, or is likely to
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Harm to competition may be shown directly, e.g., demonstrating that the conduct
restricted output or increased prices, or indirectly. 73 When anticompetitive harm is
not obvious from the nature of the conduct or its actual effects, courts generally
require an initial assessment as to whether the party engaging in the challenged
conduct has monopoly
power (also called "market power") in some properly defined
"relevant market."74 Market power has been defined as "the power to control prices
or exclude competition" in some relevant market, 75 or the ability of a firm to
"profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level."76 The justification
for evaluating market power of the firm engaging in the challenged conduct in a
properly defined market is to prevent overly aggressive antitrust enforcement which
may benefit competitors rather then consumers. 77 That is, absent sufficient market
78
power, conduct will not likely have an adverse effect on competition.

result, in consumer harm, not merely harm to competitors. See, e.g., Spanish Broad. of Fla. v. Clear
Channel Comme'n, 376 F.3d 1065, 1071 (11th Cir. 2004); Dickson v. Microsoft, 309 F.3d 193, 206
(4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Augusta News Corp. v.
Hudson News, 269 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2001); KMB Warehouse Distrib. v. Walker Mfg., 61 F.3d 123,
127 (2nd Cir. 1995); see also PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ANTITRUST LAW § 6.04(d) (3d ed. 2004).
73 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
74 Defining a "relevant market" generally requires characterization and a determination as to
the products and services involved and the geographical area in which firms offering the defined
product or service compete. Although market power is not a required element under the traditional
rule of reason analysis, recently many courts have made it a de facto element. See E. Food Serv. v.
Pontifical Catholic Univ. Serv. Ass'n, 357 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Visa, Inc., 344 F.3d
229, 238 (2nd Cir. 2003); Maris Distrib. Co. v. Anheuser Bush, 302 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2002); Cont'l
Airlines v. United Airlines, 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002); Chi. Prof1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 95 F. 3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see alsoHOLMES, supra note 65, § 2.10.
7, United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
76 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Market power can be shown
either directly, e.g., by showing actual harm which could not occur but for such power, or may be
inferred by providing evidence demonstrating that the firm has a dominant share of a relevant
market which is characterized by significant entry barriers. Id. Because nearly all firms have some
ability to profitably raise prices above what would be expected under a "perfectly competitive"
market, the extent of market power is dependent in part upon the definition of a relevant market.
Thus, defining a relevant market provides a context in which to evaluate the challenged restraint's
effect on competition. Although the term implies a singular market, it is more properly considered
the conjunction of two separate markets: (1) a product market, which consists of all products which
compete with those products on which the challenged restraint is made; and (2) a geographic
market, which helps evaluate the extent of power a firm has by defining the narrowest geographic
area in which an increase in price would be profitable. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 586 (1966). For a thorough analysis of how courts define the relevant market, see
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 60, § 2.6(b).
77 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supranote 60, § 2.1.
Antitrust is concerned with the power of market participants to distort the
competitive process. This distortion can misallocate resources, transfer wealth
from consumers and other protected groups to market participants with power, or
stifle new entry or innovation and commercialization. Without power, a market
participant can do none of these things but is, instead, itself subject to the
discipline of competition.
78 Id.
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B. CollaborationAmong Competitors
Modern antitrust jurisprudence views collaborations among competitors, also
called horizontal joint ventures, 7 9 with optimism tempered with cautious reserve.
This ambivalence stems from the general belief that such arrangements between
80
competitors often have both significant competitive and anticompetitive potential.
As succinctly stated in a popular treatise:
Joint ventures have often proved troublesome for the courts. On the
one hand, these arrangements can serve highly desirable competitive
objectives, as, for example, by enabling small market participants to pool
their resources and become a more effective competitive force, or by
facilitating research or product development that might not otherwise
occur. On the other hand, concentrating too much power in the hands of
those controlling a joint venture can create significant competitive hazards.
In particular, the venture may be misused as a subterfuge to impose illegal
competitive restraints on the venturers themselves, or may have the effect
81
of foreclosing competitors from a vital resource or market.
When firms combine resources, information, and expertise, consumers may
benefit as a result of a decrease in prices, increase in output, or enhanced
innovation.8 2 Of course, certain agreements among competitors may be a disguised
effort to increase prices, allocate markets, decrease output, or stifle innovation, and
will be denounced as unlawful despite the "collaboration" or "joint venture"
nomenclature. 83
However, even where the collaboration as a whole is either
79 For purposes of antitrust, "joint venture" has never been officially defined by statute,
guidelines, or by the U.S. Supreme Court although several treaties have given varied definitions.
See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTIRUST LAW 2100 (2d ed. 2005); EARL W. KINTNER ET AL.,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, § 11.32 (2004). Although some may define a "joint venture" as a type of
collaboration requiring significant integration between the firms, this article uses the term
collaboration and joint venture synonymously. "Horizontal" is used to indicate that the joint venture
is comprised of firms which compete against each other in some market. In contrast, "vertical" joint
ventures, consisting of firms which do not compete, operate at different levels of production, e.g,
manufacture, retail, and distribution.
80 HOLMES, supra note 65, § 2.25.

81Id.
82 Of course, whether the firms will pass on to consumers any cost reducing savings or
innovative efficiencies achieved by the joint venture is another issue. When the industry is
competitive, with the joint venture having little market power, the hope is that the market will force
prices down, causing at least some of the cost savings and innovative efficiencies to be passed on to
consumers. Similarly, it should be noted that not all cost savings are efficient.
A cost reduction is efficient when it permits the firm to produce the same output
at lower cost, or achieves cost reductions that exceed corresponding output
reductions. [For example, a]n agreement not to innovate reduces immediate costs
but also reduces the long-run benefits of innovation. Such an agreement is
anticompetitive if it eliminates innovations that would have been cost justified in
a competitive innovation market.
PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
2115(b) (2d ed. 2005).
83 "[L]abeling an arrangement a 'joint venture' will not protect what is merely a device to raise
prices or restrict output ... the nature of the conduct, not its designation, is determinative." FTC &
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.2, 4 Trade Reg.
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necessary for a product to exist or entails significant cost savings, particular
restraints imposed may be anticompetitive. 84 In these cases, modern antitrust
analysis generally evaluates the following: (1) the purpose and nature of the
restraint(s); (2) the anticompetitive effect, or potential effect, of the restraints; and (3)
whether the restraints are reasonably necessary for the achievement of the procompetitive purpose of the collaboration. 85 Accordingly, an analysis of both the
collaboration as a whole, as well as any potentially anticompetitive restraints
imposed by the collaboration, may be warranted. Because of the likelihood of finding
both pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, joint ventures are generally
evaluated under the extensive "rule of reason" analysis. 86 However, the potential
pro-competitive benefits will neither shield a collaboration, nor a particular restraint,
from being condemned as per se illegal in those cases where the facts and
87
circumstances evince that per se treatment is appropriate.
Cognizant of the ambivalent and inconsistent judicial attitude towards
competitor collaborations, federal agencies authorized to enforce the Sherman Act
Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm
(citation omitted).
84 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC,
526 U.S. 756 (1999); Polygram Holding Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Cases
involving the National Collegiate Athletic Association are also good examples. See, e.g., Law v.
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998). Despite finding that the collaboration is lawful,
certain restrictions imposed by the organizations have been found unlawful. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110, n.39 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d at 1010.
85 Gregory Werder, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
701, 707 (1998).
A collateral restraint may be reasonably necessary to the achievement of the
efficiency-enhancing purposes of a joint venture in a variety of ways. A collateral
restraint may make the venture itself operate more efficiently, as might a
requirement that joint venture participants buy exclusively from a manufacturing
joint venture, in order to facilitate the realization of economies of scale. A
collateral restraint may prevent a participant in a joint venture from
appropriating an undue share of the venture's benefits, as might exclusive
distribution territories for a brand created and promoted by a joint venture. A
collateral restraint may prevent non-participants from appropriating joint
venture benefits for which they have not shared the costs, as might restrictions on
resale of a joint venture's output to non-participants. A collateral restraint may
also prevent unintended competitive consequences that might make the venture
uneconomic.

Id.
86 EARL W. KINTNER ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, § 11.32 (2004); FTC & U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors § 1.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
87 Maricopa County Med. Soc', 457 U.S. at 351; Timken Roller Bearing v. United States, 341
U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Engine Specialties v. Bombardier LTD, 605 F.2d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 1979).
At the outset, we observe that joint ventures without more, are judged against the
standard of reasonableness rather than the per se rule.
However, the
nomenclature 'joint venture' does not automatically exempt a combination from
the per se rule which is found to have elements inherently offensive to the
antitrust laws.
FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors ex.4, 4
Trade
Reg.
Rep
(CCH)
13,
161
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
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jointly issued guidelines explaining their approach for examining such collaborative
efforts among competitors.88
Although only guidelines, Antitrust Guidehnes for
Collaboration Among Competitors is both helpful and consistent with modern
antitrust case law. 89 In these guidelines, the agencies explain their methodology for
assessing whether a collaboration or particular restraint harms competition. 90 To
summarize, the agencies first examine the nature and purpose of the collaboration or
restraint, and whether anticompetitive harm has occurred or is likely to occur as a
result of the collaboration or restraint. 91
If this initial assessment presents
significant concerns of anticompetitive harm, the agencies will conduct a more
92
detailed analysis unless it deems the collaboration or restraint to be per se illegal.
The detailed analysis includes defining the relevant market; measuring market
shares and concentrations; evaluating the ease and competitive effect of entry; and
examining factors relevant to the extent to which the participants and the
collaboration have the ability and incentive to compete independently. 93 If this
examination leads the agencies to believe that anticompetitive harm is likely, the
agencies will evaluate the pro-competitive efficiencies of the collaboration: (1)
whether the pro-competitive benefits are reasonably necessary to achieve the claimed
benefits (including the existence of less anticompetitive alternative to achieve the
claimed benefits);94 and (2) whether the pro-competitive justifications are sufficient to
95
offset the anticompetitive harm.

C Settlements of PatentDisputes
Although generally favored by an over-burdened judiciary, settlements which
result in former competitors agreeing not to compete may be anticompetitive. 96 In
recent years, settlements resulting from patent disputes have been controversial,
particularly those in the pharmaceutical industry. 97
In many of these cases,
anticompetitive issues emanate via settlements between a company with a branded,
patented drug and a company introducing a generic alternative. 98
Especially
controversial have been so-called "reverse" payments from a branded manufacturer

88 See FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§ 1.1, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.fte.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
89 Compare id. § 1.2 (discussing two types of analysis used to determine lawfulness of an
agreement among competitors), with Nat'l Soc'y of Prof1 Engr's v. United Sates, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (describing the difference "illegal per se" and rule of reason analyses).
90 See FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§ 3.3, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93 Id. § 3.34.
94 Id. § 3.36.

95 Id. § 3.37.
9 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2005).
97 Id.; see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (2005).
98 See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d 370 (2005); Schering-Plough,402 F.3d 1056 (2005).
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to a generic entrant (or potential entrant) in exchange for delayed or foregone entry. 99
Some have argued that such agreements should be condemned as a per se illegal
market allocation among competitors. 100 Others have retorted that because a patent

is involved, the agreement may be a permissible right granted under patent law, or
at the very least, are not so clearly anticompetitive as to be condemned without a
detailed analysis of the purpose of the settlement, validity of the patent, and likely
result of litigation. 10 1 For example, the authors of the prominent treatise, Antitrust
Law, have opined that assuming a bona fide dispute over patent rights, a settlement
resulting in a market allocation effectuated by cross-licensing of the very patents
whose validity and infringement are in question may be no more anticompetitive
102
than a final result granting a patent monopoly to one party.

9 See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("rule of reason" test
applied to Sherman Act restraint claim arising out of agreement under which prospective
manufacturers of generic version of a drug agreed to defer entry into generic market until after
expiration of patent, in return for payments from brand name manufacturer).
100 Ciproloxacin,261 F. Supp. 2d at 256-57.
101Id. There have been many excellent articles discussing the antitrust concerns raised by
such issues. See generallyDeborah Coleman, Antitrust Issues in the Litigation and Settlement of
Infringement Claims, 37 AKRON L. REV. 263 (2004); Marc Schildkraut, PatentSplitting Settlement
and the Reverse Payment Fallacy 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033 (2004); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis
& Mark Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of IntellectualPropertyDisputes, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1719 (2003); Howard Morse, Settlement ofIntellectualPropertyDisputes in the Pharmaceuticaland
Medical Device Industries:Antitrust Rules, 10 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 359 (2002); Daniel Crane, Exit
Payments in Settlement ofPatentInfringement Lawsuits: AntitrustRules and Economic
Implications,54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002); David Balto, PharmaceuticalPatentSettlements.* The
AntitrustRisks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000); see also Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 5.5 (1995) (regarding settlements of patent
disputes involving cross licensing agreements).
102 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
2046.
Suppose that A and B have developed potentially conflicting patents for a
superior memory device. A claims that B's practice of its patent to make the
device infringes on A's patent; B makes the same claim in reverse. The parties
begin litigation, but contemplating a long and uncertain path they instead
compromise their differences by an agreement that A will manufacture its
memory device only in a format to be used by IBM-compatible computers, and B
will manufacture its memory device only in a format for use in Apple computers.
Formally, this agreement may include a cross-license--that is, A licenses B to use
A's patent and B licenses A to use A's patent. Of course, these are cross-licenses"
of patents that both licensees assert are invalid, but the whole point of the
settlement is to avoid the cost of litigation that might ultimately determine
validity.
This scenario poses a dilemma, notwithstanding our general wish to
encourage settlement. First, in the absence of intellectual property rights the
agreement in question would be a per se unlawful market division and perhaps
even a criminal violation. Second, there is sufficient doubt about the validity or
applicability of both patents that each patentee preferred to settle rather than
litigate to a decision. Third, a likely outcome of the fully litigated dispute would be
a declaration that one firm's patent is invalid, thus yielding the entire market to
the other firm; the settlement is certainly no more anticompetitive than that
possible outcome and, depending on the circumstances, may be considerably less
anticompetitive in that it preserves both firms in the market.
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In addition to the complexities arising from whether these types of settlements
should be lawful given the underlying patent rights, another complication is the issue
of possible antitrust immunity granted for petitioning government under the socalled Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. 103 As a result, it is little surprise that courts have
been less than consistent in how they have analyzed and treated patent settlements
with "reverse" payments. 10 4 However, regardless of the legality of these types of
agreements such as with the 1996 Tanox-Novartis-Genentech settlement discussed,
the effect of precluding or forestalling competing products from the market may have
a substantial and serious impact on consumers-particularly in an area as important
as health care.

D. PatentAcquisition and Nonuse
In general, acquisition and non-use of a patent is not unlawful. A patent holder
may use, license, or shelve an invention as he or she pleases: "A patent owner is not
in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public or under any obligation to see that the
public acquires the free right to use the invention. He has no obligation either to use
it or to grant its use to others." 105 However, both case law and commentary evince
that acquisition and non-use of patents may be unlawful if either (1) done
unilaterally by a firm with market power as a means of obtaining or maintaining
power in a relevant market; or (2) done as part of a collaborative effort with the
10 6
purpose and effect of harming competition.

103 See supra, note 101. The aforementioned cited articles discuss the controversy regarding
when and to what extent Noerr-Pennington immunity should apply and has been applied. See also

Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 212.
10 Compare In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2nd Cir. 2005), with
Schering Plough v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), and In ro Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Andrx Pharm. v. Biovail Corp., 256 F.3d 799
(D.C. Cir. 2001); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochrloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188
(E.D.N.Y.2003).
105 Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)
(2000).
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of
the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2)
licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to
enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4)
refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of
any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in
view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.
Id.
106 See, e.g., Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952); Kurt M. Saunders,
PatentNonuse and the Role ofPublic Interestas a Deterrentto Teehnology Suppression, 15 HARV.
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Regarding unilateral conduct, even courts have found patent acquisition and
non-use to be unlawful when done by a firm with market power for the purpose of
protecting a monopoly or other anticompetitive purposes. 107 For example, in Kobe v.
Dempsey Pump Co., the court found that a company which held numerous patents on
hydraulic pumps used in pumping oil from wells violated antitrust law because for
several years the company actively purchased every major patent for hydraulic
pumps with the purpose and effect of protecting its monopoly.108 Also, in Bloeh v.
SmithKline, the court refused to grant the defendant summary judgment on an
antitrust claim which alleged that the defendant purchased an exclusive license for
the sole purpose of suppressing it because the licensed product, if developed, would
compete with one of the defendant's existing products. 10 9 Other cases have upheld
similar allegations as cognizable claims: defendants have obtained exclusive rights
from inventors, rivals, collaborators, and even employees for the purpose of
suppressing competition.11 0 Additionally, several commentators have opined that
where anticompetitive purpose or effect are found, unilateral acquisition by a firm
with market power should be unlawful. 1
The authors of Antitrust Law take a

J.L. & TECH. 389 (2002); United States v. Parker -Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945);
Cohen & Burke, supra note 1.
107 Kobe, 198 F.2d at 416; Bloch v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., No. 82-510, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12397, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1988).
108Kobe, 198 F.2d at 423.
109 Bloeh, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12397, at *26.
110See Parker-Rust-ProofCo., 61 F. Supp. at 811 (acquisition of an exclusive license from
significant rival for purpose of eliminating competition violated Section 1 and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act); Magic Chef v. Rockwell Int'l, 561 F. Supp. 732, 734 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Plaintiff, a
former licensee of a product developed by a joint venture in which the defendant was a participant,
alleged that the defendant, via several acts, drove the joint venture and all other participants into
bankruptcy for purpose of buying the patents rights in an auction, using the license exclusively, and
refusing to license it. The court denied the defendants motion to dismiss.); see also McDonald v.
Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1373-75 (8th Cir. 1983); Turner v. Johnson & Johnson, 549 F.
Supp. 807, 809 (D. Mass. 1982) (two cases involving purchases by the defendant, Johnson &
Johnson, of smaller companies, where the plaintiffs were former employees of the purchased
companies who alleged that as part of the purchase agreement, the defendant agreed to develop and
market a certain product of the former company, but that after the purchase intentionally
suppressed the product because it competed with Defendant's product(s). In both cases, although
the court found suppression had occurred, summary judgment was granted for the defendant on
grounds of lack of standing); Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 728-29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (The plaintiff invented and licensed an electronic lamp ballast to Defendant, which was
capable of dimming florescent lights when exposed to increasing levels of natural light. According to
the plaintiff, in exchange for the license the defendant promised to use its best efforts to produce and
market the device. After a few years, the product was still not developed and the plaintiff sued
alleging that the defendant was suppressing the product because it would compete with the
defendant's magnetic ballasts. The court dismissed the antitrust claims on standing grounds.); see
also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that the patent
acquisition involved did not violate Section 2, the court noted, "[s]urely, § 2 violation will have
occurred where, for example, the dominant competitor in a market acquires a patent covering a
substantial share of the same market that he knows when added to his existing share will afford
him monopoly power").
111 See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 71, at §§ 73.01, 73.02(2)(a); JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 8.05(1)(b) (1994); Saunders, supra note 106, at 433-34; Cohen &
Burke, supra note 1; Yee Wah Chin, Unilateral Technology Suppression."AppropriateAntitrust and
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particularly strong position: An acquisition of exclusive rights in "related" patents by
a firm with market power ought to be unlawful by itself without having to provide
evidence of non-use. 112 Finally, a review of non-patent cases suggests that, even in
the absence of intellectual property rights, the acquisition of an essential or valuable
resource from a rival, for anticompetitive purposes, could potentially violate antitrust
law.

113

Joint firm acquisition and non-use of patents has also been condemned under
antitrust law. 114 These issues have been raised most frequently in cases involving
"patent pools" and cross-licensing agreements between firms. 115
When these
Patent Law Remedies, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 441 (1998); John Flynn, Antitrust Poleiy Innovation
Effkienies, and the Supp-ression of Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, n.57 (1998).
112 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 707a. As defined, a related patent is:
any patented product or process that is a substitute for or an improvement upon
the monopolized product, a component thereof, or the process used in producing it.
A related patent may cover the competitive equivalent of the product, component,
or process of the monopolist; it may be inferior; it may be an improvement patent
,subservient' to the monopolist's basic patent; or it may cover a superior noninfringing product or process.

Id.
By acquiring a patent, the monopolist might prevent present or future
competition challenging its monopoly. The clearest case would be the acquisition
of an equivalent patent covering the only known economic alternative to the
monopolist's product or process. Such an acquisition forecloses potential
competition by rivals who might otherwise have access to that patent. Even the
acquisition of one out of several equivalent patents might have exclusionary
effects. The acquired patent might--with further advances in the art--turn out to
have been the most promising. As a practical matter, it is not worthwhile to try to
make that kind of determination or even to try to determine which patents are
equivalent.
Similarly, the acquisition of an inferior patent would have
anticompetitive effects whenever third parties had developed, subsequently
developed, or subsequently would have developed improvements that make it
equal or superior to the monopolist's patent. Again, it would be difficult in
practice to determine whether that would be the result or, indeed, whether the
patent was "inferior" to start with. The acquisition of an exclusive license in a
patent covering an improvement to the monopolist's basic patent might enable the
monopolist to perpetuate its monopoly beyond the period of the basic patent. The
acquisition facilitates protection not only for the original life of the basic patent,
but also for the life of the improvement patent. And even if any particular
improvement patent is relatively unimportant in itself, there are the
anticompetitive dangers of accumulation.
Id. 707b; see also id. 7 708e, 803dl; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK JANIS, AND MARK LEMLEY, IP
AND ANTITRUST, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
§14.4 (2002) (agreeing with ANTITRUST LAW).
1i:1"Predatory hiring" cases are a good example. In these sparse cases, it has been alleged that
the defendant company hired one or more of its rivals' essential employees for the purpose of
harming its competitors, rather then for their skill. Although no court has yet to rule on the issue, a
few courts have stated that, if proven, such assertions may violate the Sherman Act. See Taylor
Publ'g v. Jostens, 216 F.3d 465, 480 (5th Cir. 2000); Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Pub. Co, 942 F.2d
1294, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1991); Universal Analytics v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 914 F.2d 1256,
1258 (9th Cir. 1990); Wichita Clinic v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1195
(D. Kan. 1999).
14 Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 423 (10th Cir. 1952).
115 A "patent pool" is the sharing, or "pooling" by two or more firms of exclusive rights granted
under each other's patents. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 2043. "Cross licensing"
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agreements have an anticompetitive purpose and effect, antitrust liability may
result.116

Thus, for example, in Kobe, two firms created a patent pool with numerous
acquired patents for hydraulic pumps. 11 7 Because the court found that the "purpose
of the pool was to acquire patents relating to hydraulic pumps and to do everything
reasonably within its power to 'build up and maintain its patent monopoly,"' the
court held the arrangement to be unlawful.118
In United States v. Singer
Manufacturing,defendant Singer was the sole U.S. manufacturer of household zigzag
sewing machines. 19
Singer entered into an agreement with two European
manufacturers of sewing machines, involving cross-licensing and the transfer of a
patent, purportedly to obviate the need to litigate the validity and infringement of a
dubious patent.1 20 Because the court found "a common purpose to suppress the
Japanese machine competition in the United States through the use of the patent," it
1 21
held that the agreement was an unreasonable restraint under the Sherman Act.
Similarly, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, the Supreme Court held that a patent
pool violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because the pool's "chief purpose" was to
exclude competition and it was effective in doing so.

122

III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF THE TANOX-NOVARTIS-GENENTECH COLLABORATION

is a very common way in which pooling is done, where each participant in the pool grants a cross
license to each other member. Id. Patent pools come in many forms, and range from simple crosslicensing agreements to creation of separate "holding" companies to which the relevant patents are
assigned.
116
Kobe, 198 F.2d at 423.
117'd. at 419-20.
118Id. Defendant Kobe was actually a holding company created by former competitors, which
is why both Section 1 and Section 2 liability were imposed. Key to the decision was the finding that
for approximately 15 years, the firms actively acquired all material patents relating to hydraulic
pumps, while continuing to manufacture the same product under the original patent. The acquired
patents were neither used nor improved upon.
119
United States v. Singer Mfg., 374 U.S. 174, 176 (1963).
120 Id. at 180-84.
121Id. at 195.
122 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969). Hazeltine involved, inteoralia,several
Canadian manufacturers of televisions and radios who had transferred patents to a holding
company which refused licenses to any importer who did not manufacture in Canada (and comply
with other rules). In holding that the pool, acting in conspiracy with American patent holders,
violated section 1, the court found that "[t]he chief purpose of the pool was to protect the
manufacturing members and licensees from competition by American and other foreign companies
seeking to export their products into Canada." Id. at 115. The pool aggressively acted to prevent
importation by U.S. firms, policing the markets, sent warning notices to distributors, dealers, and
consumers, and initiated infringement suits and threats. Id.; see also Honeywell v. Sperry Rand
Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cases
74,874 (E.D. Minn. 1973) (condemning exclusive cross-licensing
arrangements between leading tabulating machine maker and leading data processing machine
maker which allegedly kept other firms out of the market); U.S. v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 1955
Trade Cases 68,093 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (consent decree prohibiting manufacturers of metal wheels
from, inter alia,jointly acquiring patents, entering into cross-licensing agreements where licensing
outside of the pool was prohibited, or entering into non-compete agreements with competitors);
United States v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157 (D.N.J. 1949) (challenging a settlement
which resulted in an agreement between firms to cross-license and aggressively exclude rivals).
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In this section, I will discuss the two primary competitive concerns raised by the
anti-lgE collaborative efforts between Tanox, Novartis, and Genentech: (1) whether
the collaboration as a whole was anticompetitive; and (2) whether the prohibition
against Tanox's independent development rights to CGP 56901 was an unreasonable
restraint.

A. Assessment of the CollaborationAs a Whole
As previously mentioned, antitrust law views horizontal collaborations with a
123
certain amount of apprehension, but acknowledges that they are often beneficial.
In assessing whether the collaboration as a whole is anticompetitive, courts and
enforcement agencies generally focus on the nature of the collaboration, its purpose,
124
and its effect or potential effect.

1. Nature of the Collaboration
Because certain agreements are more likely than others to have harmful effects,
the nature of the collaboration is pertinent to whether it may be anticompetitive.
Thus, antitrust law regards production collaborations, marketing collaborations,
buying collaborations, standard setting collaborations, and R&D collaborations
somewhat differently. 125 Generally, R&D collaborations have been viewed favorably
1 26
and encouraged by both federal legislation and enforcement agencies.
Nevertheless, it has been acknowledged that these collaborations may be
anticompetitive if they stifle the pace of R&D efforts or lower the quality of
1 27
products.

123 Marc G. Schildkraut, Payment-SplittingSettlements and the Reverse Payment Fallay,71
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1051 (2004).
124 Soo, e.g., Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); FTC & U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.3, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
7 13, 161 (2000), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/1O/jointventureguidelines.htm.
125 FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors §
3.31(a),
4
Trade
Reg.
Rep
(CCH)
7
13,
161
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
7 2134-37.
126 National Cooperative Research and Production Cooperative Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 4301-06 (2000)
(enacted in 1984, amended in 1993, and designed to encourage efficient, beneficial joint research). If
a collaboration meets the statutory requirements, it must be evaluated under the rule of reason. 15
U.S.C. § 4302 (2000). Moreover, if the collaboration files proper notice with the Department of
Justice, subsequent antitrust damages will be limited to single rather than treble damages. 15
U.S.C. § 4303 (2000); see also FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration
Among Competitors § 3.31(a), 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) 7
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm (stating that research and development
collaborations are usually pro-competitive and thereby evaluated by the agencies under the rule of
reason).
127 FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§ 3.31.(a),
4
Trade
Reg.
Rep
(CCH)
7
13,
161
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/j ointventureguidelines.htm.
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Although benign on its face, the facts surrounding the creation, structure, and
respective roles of the participants in the Tanox-Novartis-Genentech collaboration,
along with issues pertaining to the collaboration's purpose and effect, raise
considerable concerns regarding its effect on innovation of anti-IgE antibody
products. In particular, Tanox's limited role in the collaboration and the prohibition
on its independent development of CGP 56901, raise concerns about Taxon's ability
and incentives to compete with the collaboration and its other members. 128 Unlike
Novartis and Genentech, Tanox is a small company, which, at the time the
collaboration was formed, had limited financing, few prospects for successful
development and commercialization (apart from XOLAIR and CGP 56901), and
continues to be heavily dependent on the success of XOLAIR for its existence and
129
profitability.

2. Purpose of the Collaboration
Although not conclusive, the underlying purpose behind any conduct may be
relevant in determining its likely anticompetitive effect.130 As applied to the TanoxNovartis-Genentech collaboration, the purported purpose was to settle patent
disputes and jointly develop anti-IgE antibody products. 131 However, despite this
seemingly benign (and potentially beneficial) purpose, there are considerable factors
that insinuate an anticompetitive purpose.
Tanox was the first of the collaborators to develop and patent anti-IgE
antibodies. 13 2 Subsequently, both the Tanox-Novartis collaboration and Genentech
each developed two anti-IgE antibodies separately. 133 Prior to the Agreements,
Genentech and Tanox twice attempted to reach an agreement (and litigated for two
years) before a collaboration between Tanox and Genentech did occur-as an
essential condition for the settlement of all litigation. 13 4 The context in which the
collaboration arose not only calls into question whether it was sincerely desired by all
parties, but also, whether settlement of the patent dispute via establishment of the
collaboration was on the whole pro-competitive.

128
129

Id.

Annual Report, supra note 11, at 6-7.
See Annual Report, supranote 11, at 20-21.
Our results of operations and future prospects are highly dependent on increasing
the sales of our only commercial product, XOLAIR. Our revenues in 2004
consisted largely of revenue from product sales of XOLAIR, and we expect that
revenues from sales of XOLAIR will constitute a larger percentage of our revenue
in the next several years... Under the terms of our collaboration agreements,
Novartis and Genentech are generally responsible for conducting clinical trials on,
obtaining regulatory approval for, and manufacturing, marketing and distributing
XOLAIR. Our ability to profit from the products covered by our collaboration
agreements with Genentech and Novartis depends in large part on their
performance.

130 Cf

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, n.21 (1978).

131

Annual Report, supra note 11, at 6-7.

132

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6.

133
134
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The structure of the collaboration, and particularly the participants' respective
roles, is also indicative of an anticompetitive purpose. As mentioned, Tanox had a
very limited role in the collaboration-essentially licensing its patents and receiving
considerable payments. 135 Tanox did not share in the cost of development of the
drug, and only shared in manufacturing and commercialization costs if it decided to
exercise those rights (which were limited in themselves to Asia primarily).136
Although it is possible that Tanox provided necessary knowledge and expertise to the
137
collaboration, it is unlikely given the facts.
When considered in total, the manner in which the collaboration arose, the
respective roles of the participants, and the significance of the restraint against
independent development rights (which Novartis and Genentech fought hard to
enforce) raises serious doubts regarding the collaboration as an efficiency enhancing
effort to develop and commercialize a new drug. Rather, it seems more like a clever
means of stifling competition via patent acquisition and non-use.

3. Effect of the Collaboration
To fully assess the effects of the collaboration, a proper analysis necessitates an
examination of both the adverse effects and the pro-competitive justifications.
Regarding the Tanox-Novartis-Genentech collaboration, there are two principal
anticompetitive effects: (i) a decrease in competition for the development of anti-lgE
antibody products and (2) the shelving of a particular competing antibody, which
showed promise in clinical trials. There are two pro-competitive justifications as
well: (1) substantial efficiencies due to sharing of information, expertise, and costs
and (2) that "but for" the collaboration, XOLAIR may not have been developed.

a. Anticompetitive Effects
Addressing the first potential anticompetitive effect, the collaboration
138
indisputably decreased competition in the development of anti-IgE products.
However, this does not amount to an ijpso facto determination that the collaboration
was wholly anticompetitive. As mentioned, under modern antitrust doctrine, the
critical assessment in ascertaining whether conduct is anticompetitive or not is

13 5

Id. at 6-7.
6-7.

136 Id. at
'7 Id. at

6-7. XOLAIR is Genentech's antibody, and thus Tanox probably has no particular
expertise or knowledge regarding its development. Id. Moreover, Novartis and Genentech have a
great deal more experience in developing and commercializing drugs. See Genentech's Motion for
Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 5, Genentech, Inc. v. Tanox, Inc., No. 99-2060
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001). The fact that XOLAIR was developed successfully despite Tanox being
excluded from meetings of the Steering Committee and denied access to information on the drug,
would tend to contravene finding that Tanox was an integral part of the collaboration.

See

Genentech's Opposition to Tanox's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Genentech, No. 99-2060
(Sept. 10, 2001).
138 Annual Report, supra note 11, at 6-7.
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whether the conduct harms consumers.1 39 Depending upon the competitiveness of
140
the market, a decrease in competition may have no effect on consumers.
Accordingly, to ascertain the competitive effect of the Tanox-Novartis-Genentech
collaboration requires a preliminary evaluation of the industry, i.e., market
concentration, entry barriers, potential entrants, viable substitutes (if any), and in
particular, the existence and extent of market power. 141 Unless the collaboration was
a sham or otherwise created for anticompetitive purposes, then absent evidence of
market power, the collaboration would be deemed lawful with no additional
1 42
evaluation of the collaboration and its effects necessary.
Regarding the second potential anticompetitive harm, the stifling of a promising,
potentially competing drug, this concern is also insufficient by itself to condemn the
collaboration outright. First, assuming that the collaboration was established for a
valid purpose and the collaborators genuinely believed that XOLAIR was the better
drug to develop, 1 43 it would be imprudent to attach antitrust liability ex post facto
13) Se FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§ 2.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/1O/jointventureguidelines.htm.
140 In fact, it has been asserted that decreased competition caused by a joint venture of former
competitors may even benefit consumers in the long run. See 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
2100 (2004). Under this
theory, the promised benefits of increased innovation resulting from a collaboration of former
competitors may outweigh even an immediate short term consumer loss (from coordination of output
or increase in prices). Id. Moreover, it is important to remember that the collaboration was limited
in scope to the four antibodies that were identified in the Outline of Terms, which where XOLAIR,
E26, CGP 56901, and CGP 51901. Outline of Terms attached to Declaration of Nancy Chang In
Support Of Defendant Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment § 1, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb.
28, 2001). The parties were free to independently develop other drugs which would compete with
the collaboration.
Id.
This is clearly relevant for assessing the competitive effect of the
collaboration and the prohibition against independent development.
141 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-94 (1956). In this case,
the relevant market would probably be the "innovation market" for the research and development of
anti-IgE antibody products. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.3 (1995) (expressly recognizing the existence of
"innovation markets.").

If a licensing arrangement may adversely affect competition to develop new or
improved goods or processes, the Agencies will analyze such an impact either as a
separate competitive effect in relevant goods or technology markets, or as a
competitive effect in a separate innovation market...
An innovation market
consists of the research and development directed to particular new or improved
goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development.
The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, and
goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the
relevant research and development, for example by limiting the ability and
incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of research and
development.
Id.
112 See FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§
3.2,
4
Trade
Reg.
Rep
(CCH)
13,
161
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
This is assuming, of course, that it is
determined that the collaboration is not merely a farce to stifle competition, fix prices, or decrease
output, in which case it would be per se illegal, regardless of any anticompetitive effects. Id.
143 That is, at the time the decision was made, Tanox, Novartis, and Genentech believed
XOLAIR would be a better choice to develop and commercialize than the other three anti-IgE
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even assuming that it is later determined that CGP5601 was a better drug to develop
and commercialize or that both drugs could have been developed. If participants of a
joint venture had to fear antitrust liability for engaging in conduct for other than
anticompetitive purposes that subsequently resulted in harm to competition,
potentially beneficial collaborations would likely be deterred. 144 Second, because
patent law does not require a patent holder to use or share his patents, then absent
evidence that the purpose or nature of the collaboration is anticompetitive, assessing
antitrust liability against a collaboration for non-use of a patent would be
inconsistent with the Patent Act. 145 Consequently, condemning a collaboration
outright based on the joint decision not to develop a single drug, without considering
the nature and purpose of the collaboration, pro-competitive justifications, or some
146
market analysis, would not only conflict with patent law, but would be bad policy.

A. Pro-CompetitiveJustifications
The potential pro-competitive justifications, although plausible, suffer from a
lack of factual support. First, Tanox's limited role in the collaboration, its exclusion
from Steering Committee meetings, and its lack of access to confidential information
on XOLAIR, contravenes the assertion that the tripartite collaboration was necessary
(by creating substantial efficiencies via the sharing of knowledge and expertise).
Second, any argument that development of XOLAIR could not have occurred but for
the collaboration is spurious. This is not a case where firms cooperated for the
purpose of making a new discovery or invention. Rather, the collaboration involved
developing and commercializing antibody products from antibodies which were
alreadyidentified and synthesized.147 Viewed in this manner, the collaboration could
just as readily be characterized as a production joint venture than as an R&D joint

antibodies that were "owned" by the collaboration for valid business reasons, e.g., it would be less
costly to develop or take through clinical trials, health reasons, or scientific reasons, and that it
would not be cost efficient or practicable to develop both drugs. Outline of Terms attached to
Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support Of Defendant Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment § 3,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
"I If the members of the joint venture or the collaboration had market power, antitrust
liability for conduct engaged in for other than anticompetitive purposes that resulted in foreseeable
anticompetitiveeffects could arguably be the basis of sound policy.
11 Of course, there are many who disagree with the U.S. rule granting the patent holder an
unfettered right to his patent, and not permitting forced licensing regardless of the social benefit of
the invention.
'16 See FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§
3.2,
4
Trade
Reg.
Rep
(CCH)
13,
161
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
Although in this case consumers may in
fact be harmed by the stifling of a promising drug, a rule that would condemn the collaboration on
this fact alone is probably overbroad. Imagine, for instance, that this same collaboration invented a
new life saving drug, which due to the substantial cost and risks, no firm on its own would have
attempted to create and develop.
147 Se FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§ 3.31(a), 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http ://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
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venture. 148 Moreover, XOLAIR was Genentech's antibody, which it brought to the
collaboration. 149 Genentech is a large pharmaceutical company with substantial
resources and expertise in developing and commercializing drugs-which is one
reason why Tanox initially sought to collaborate with Genentech in 1989.150
Consequently, it is not likely that Genentech needed Tanox to develop XOLAIR.

B. Assessment of the RestraintAgainst IndependentDevelopment
As with the analysis of the Tanox-Novartis-Genentech collaboration as a whole,
in evaluating the reasonableness of the restriction against Tanox's independent
development rights to CGP 56901, the nature of the restraint, its purpose, and its
effects must be examined. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the restraint,
an additional step is required. If it is determined that the restraint is not per se
illegal, and a plausible, legally cognizable pro-competitive justification for the
restraint has been proffered, an analysis regarding whether the restraint was
reasonably necessary to achieve such a pro-competitive benefit should be made.

1. Nature of the Restraint
A restraint which prohibits participants of a collaboration from engaging in any
activity that competes with the collaboration is tantamount to an agreement not to
compete or a market allocation. 151 Generally such agreements are held to be per se
152
illegal because they have the likely effect of raising prices or decreasing output.
However, courts and enforcement agencies have recognized that in the context of a
joint venture, a restraint of the type that would normally be per se illegal may have
significant pro-competitive effects, e.g., permitting the creation a new product, and
thus may avoid per se treatment if reasonably necessary to achieve the procompetitive effects. 153 "To be reasonably necessary, the restraint must not only
118That is not to say that obtaining FDA approval, developing a drug, producing the drug, and
commercializing it are easy tasks. These endeavors require a tremendous amount of resources,
which is a classic justification for granting a patent on drugs. In this case, the Steering Committee
selected XOLAIR only after the Phase II clinical trials of the antibodies were completed. A
substantial amount of resources were still required prior to obtaining approval for XOLAIR and
commercializing the drug. Outline of Terms attached to Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support Of
Defendant Tanox's Motion For Summary Judgment § 1, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
19 Outline of Terms attached to Declaration of Nancy Chang In Support Of Defendant Tanox's
Motion For Summary Judgment § 1, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
150 Defendant Tanox Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Notice of Motion at 5, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Aug. 15, 2001).
151 Seo United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); FTC & U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
152 See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48 (1990); United States v. Topco Assoc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among
Competitors
§ 3.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13,
161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/j ointventureguidelines.htm.
153 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); Polk Bros. v. Forest
City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985); Rothery Storage & Van v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d
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promote the legitimate objective but must also do so significantly better than the
available less restrictive alternatives."' 15 4 Nevertheless, even in the context of a
beneficial, pro-competitive joint venture, restraints on non-venture activities are
generally viewed as likely anticompetitive and not reasonably necessary to the
venture. 155
Based on the pertinent facts in this case, the parties might proffer the following
three justifications for the restraint against independent development: (1) the
restraint prevented the collaborators from "free riding" off knowledge and
information of the collaboration, for their private use and exploitation; (2) "but for"
the restraint, no collaboration would have been agreed to; and (3) independent
development of CGP 56901 risked potential non-competitive harm to the success of
XOLAIR.
Regarding "free riding," Novartis and Genentech have asserted in pleadings that
one reason why they refused to grant Tanox independent development rights was
because they did not believe it was fair to allow Tanox to free ride off of their
expertise and knowledge in the development of XOLAIR for its private use in
developing CGP 56901.156 Although free riding considerations have been accepted as

210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
see also FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaboration Among Competitors § 3.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm
("Before accepting a claim that an
agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits from an integration of
economic activity, the Agencies undertake a limited factual inquiry to evaluate the claim."); 11
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION
1912c (2004) ("An ancillary restraint is one that is reasonably related to a joint
venture or transaction that, at least on initial examination, promises to increase output, reduce
costs, improve product quality, or otherwise benefit consumers.").
It is important to recall that if a restraint is found to be per se illegal, it will be condemned
irrespective of market power-and without any analysis of the market. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986). All other restraints will require some analysis, although
depending on the nature and effect of the restrain, a full blown rule of reason may not be required.
See id. at 458; Polygram Holding Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Law v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
'5 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION
1505 (2004).
An agreement may be "reasonably necessary" without being essential. However, if
the participants could achieve an equivalent or comparable efficiency-enhancing
integration through practical, significantly less restrictive means, then the
Agencies conclude that the agreement is not reasonably necessary. In making this
assessment, except in unusual circumstances, the Agencies consider whether
practical, significantly less restrictive means were reasonably available when the
agreement was entered into, but do not search for a theoretically less restrictive
alternative that was not practical given the business realities.
FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors §
3.2,
4
Trade
Reg.
Rep
(CCH)
13,
161
(2000),
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.
155 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION
2131c (2004); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(rejecting free riding justification for non-venture restraints). But see SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 972 (10th Cir. 1994).
156 See Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 5,
Genentech, Inc. v. Tanox, Inc., No. 99-2060 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2001).
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a sufficient justification for certain restraints in a joint venture, 157 and may well be
appropriate in the context of an R&D collaboration, as applied to the Tanox-NovartisGenentech collaboration, it does not appear to be particularly compelling. First, the
facts do not manifest significant free riding concerns. Although CGP 56901 was
developed and taken to Phase II clinical trials by the Tanox-Novartis collaboration, it
was created from Tanox's research and discovery. 158 The tripartite collaboration
chose to develop XOLAIR, an asthma drug, instead of CGP 56901, which was
designed to treat peanut allergies.1 59 Thus, absent evidence revealing that Tanox
unlawfully used confidential information or trade secrets, free riding concerns do not
appear to be exceptional.1 60
Second, an outright prohibition of independent
development seems excessive, that is, not reasonably necessary to prevent any
justifiable free riding concerns. Other less restrictive means were available, such as
1 61
a confidentiality agreement.
Tanox would be free-riding off Genentech by asking Genentech to carry the
significant costs of research and development of Tanox's molecule while giving
Genentech potentially no rights in that molecule in return. Since Tanox was far
less experienced than Genentech in regulatory proceedings, manufacturing, and
marketing, Genentech also-rightly-feared that Tanox would be taking unfair
advantage of Genentech's expertise in those areas in furtherance of Tanox's
scheme to develop a product that Tanox then would use to compete against the
contemplated collaboration.

Id.
157 See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994); Rothery
Storage & Van v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 2131c (2004).
158 Recall that Tanox was the first of the collaborators to develop anti-IgE antibodies, and
sought collaborations primarily because it needed financing and assistance with development and
commercialization. See Annual Report, supra note 11, at 3, 6-7. Thus in all likelihood, the
inventiveness behind CGP 56901 was a result of Tanox's research.
159 See Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 10,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
160 Absent concerns of unlawful use of confidential information or trade secrets, defining a
collaborator's use of any knowledge, skill, or experience obtained in a collaboration as "free riding"
would be perverse. As defined, "fiee riding" would include experience and skills learned by an
individual on the job, and could be used to defend broad non-compete restraints for ex-employees.
161 In fact, in the Complaint, Novartis and Genentech did assert a claim that the Outline of
Terms included a confidentially agreement and that Tanox violated it by using confidential
information in the development of CGP 56901, as well as misappropriation of trade secrets. See
Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing, Unfair Competition and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
50-52, 77-79,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Apr. 29, 1999). However, the court essentially dismissed this claim,
finding that under the Outline of Terms, Tanox ". . . retained independent development rights under
the D&L Agreement after signing the Outline of Terms" and that ". . . the Outline of Terms permits
Tanox's use of confidential information in the process of developing rejected antibodies."
Memorandum and Order at 2, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Oct. 9, 2001). The fact that an arbitration
panel subsequently decided that the scope and extent of Tanox's independent development rights
did not extend to the development of CGP 56901, does not alter the finding that Tanox did not
violate any confidentially agreement in the Outline of Terms.
More pertinent for antitrust purposes: if Genentech and Novartis's primary claim against
independent development was that it should be prevented because it was developed via using
unlawful confidential information, know-how, and trade secrets, and could prove that, the case
would be very different. But instead, from the very beginning Novartis and Genentech's chief
argument was that Tanox was contractually prohibited from developing CGP 56901 for the very
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The "but for" justification is essentially that the collaboration would not have
occurred without the restraint because Novartis and Genentech would have never
agreed to it.162 While this may be true, it is not obvious whether this result would
harm eonsumers. As previously noted, any claim that XOLAIR would not have been
created "but for" the collaboration is disingenuous. Thus, because XOLAIR would
have been created regardless, the only benefit of the collaboration for consumers
would be if it resulted in decreased prices, increased output, faster
commercialization, or more expansive commercialization. Moreover, even if some or
all of these benefits came to fruition, they would have to be weighed against the
potential benefits of CGP 56901 being developed. That is, absent the collaboration,
Tanox may have been able to help those with peanut allergies by developing CGP
56901 via obtaining sufficient financing to develop the drug on its own, entering into
a different collaboration which actually developed the drug, or selling the patent
rights to another firm that was able to develop it.163 Accordingly, the "but for"
justification is not especially compelling, since it is not evident that the "but for"
scenario is any worse; and, in fact, it could have been better.
Finally, the "harm" justification for the restraint can be dismissed fairly easily.
The crux of this argument appears to be that that Tanox's independent development
of CGP 56901 could adversely affect XOLAIR's approval by the FDA because: (1) as a
new, inexperienced company, Tanox may fail to obtain FDA approval for CGP 56901;
and (2) similarities between XOLAIR and CGP 56901 may adversely affect FDA
approval of XOLAIR. 164 Assuming this to be true, a prohibition on independent
development does not appear to be "reasonably necessary" to preventing the harm.
That is, other less restrictive means are available to protect the purported harm
such as having Tanox compensate Genentech and/or Novartis for assisting it in
obtaining FDA approval, or requiring that Tanox wait until XOLAIR obtains FDA
approval before seeking approval for CGP 56901.165

reason that it would compete with XOLAIR and that they would never have entered into the
Agreements if Tanox were permitted to independently develop CGP 56901.
162 See Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 2,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001) ("Why would Genentech and Novartis have agreed to a
'collaboration' that not only allows Tanox to undermine the collaborative market share but also
jeopardizes the success of the collaboration altogether? They would not have, and they did not").
6:3 Of course, this assumes that CGP 56901 successfully treated peanut allergies, completed
clinical trials, was approved by the FDA, and was developed and commercialized.
104 Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 1, 6, Genenteeh,
No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001).
Tanox has never undertaken any development like this before, and Tanox admits
that any misstep in its unilateral development of the backup molecule [CGP
56901] could have profound effects on the approval and usage of E25 [XOLAIR]
itself.... [J]f Tanox were to seek regulatory approval for its molecule at the same
time as the contemplated collaboration [XOLAIR], any setbacks suffered by Tanox
due to inferior research or Tanox's pursuit of regulatory approval could have
serious implications for the collaboration's chosen molecule as well, given the two
molecule's similar activity.

Id.
165 XOLAIR obtained FDA approval for the treatment of asthma in 2003. Letter from Sharon
T. Risso, Acting Dirctor, Center for Biological Evaluation and Research to Robert L. Garnick, Senior
Vice President, Genentech, Inc. This occurred after the Outline of Terms, but before the final,
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2. Purpose of the Restraint
As evinced throughout the record in the litigation, Novartis and Genentech's
chief motive for prohibiting Tanox from developing CGP 56901, is the belief that it
would compete with XOLAIR and moreover, that it would bestow an unfair windfall
to Tanox:
Tanox has single-handedly attempted to develop the E25 backupoption molecule-a molecule that Tanox itself rejected in favor of
E25-to compete with its collaborators Genentech and Novartis in the
anti-IgE marketplace. By doing so, Tanox has breached both the
plain language of the Outline of Terms and its underlying intent by
appropriating for itself a molecule that belongs to the tripartite
collaboration.
Tanox could still take market share away from the collaboration
if Tanox persisted in asserting "independent development rights" in a
molecule that the collaboration had jointly developed. For even if
Tanox sought FDA approval for different uses of the molecule than
those intended for the collaboration's chosen molecule, doctors could
still legitimately prescribe Tanox's drug "off label"-and potentially at
lower cost-for the indications originally targeted by the
collaboration. 166
Considering that Genentech and Novartis incurred the cost and risk of
developing and commercializing XOLAIR, while Tanox received substantial payment
and royalties, this rationale is somewhat understandable. Tanox clearly benefited
from the collaboration, and hence, if its development of CGP 56901 results in it
profiting at the expense of its fellow collaborators, it is not surprising that the latter
might perceive this as an unfair windfall. 167 However, antitrust law is not
particularly concerned with profits or fairness among collaborators of a business

Tripartite Collaboration Agreement was executed on February 25, 2004. XOLAIR has not yet
obtained approval for the treatment of peanut allergies.
166 Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 1, 6-7,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001). Counsel for Genentech states:
What I would like is if we could get a protective order entered so that the
documents could get produced. We can take some depositions, and we can come in
here and either get an injunction or a declaration that that competing product
been stopped.... Over a hundred million dollars have already been spent, and
there will be huge expenses coming up for promotion when they launch the
product, so we really need to not have a competing product in the market from our
strategic partner.
Transcript of Proceedings at 9, Genentech, No. 99-2060 (June 12, 2000).
167 This, of course, depends on one's views of the collaboration, and how it was formed: an
efficient, consensual agreement to jointly develop a drug, sharing costs and know-how, or an
acquiescence by Tanox after failed negotiations, various lawsuits, and years of litigation.
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venture, but with competition and consumer welfare. 168 Accordingly, when evidence
suggests that the primary motive behind a restraint imposed by a collaboration of
former competitors is to hinder non-venture activities, then absent substantial procompetitive justifications, such a purpose is generally deemed anticompetitive and
condemned.

3. Effect of the Restraint
Although not typical, in this case the anticompetitive effect of the restraint is
probably the same as the effect of the collaboration as a whole, and as a result, the
two cannot be separated and treated independently. Here, the record evinces that
the restraint regarding independent development rights was an integral component
of the collaboration, and it is likely that the collaboration would not have been
formed absent the restraint. 169 The importance of the restraint is obvious from the
record: (1) Both the 1989 and 1993 collaboration attempts between Tanox and
Genentech failed due in significant part to disagreement over Tanox's independent
development rights and (2) many years and millions of dollars in litigation costs were
170
spent disputing the scope and extent of Tanox's independent development rights.
Also, Genentech and Novartis have argued in pleadings that "but for" the restraint,
they would not have agreed to the collaboration. 171 Given the facts surrounding the
creation of the collaboration, the resources which Genentech and Novartis expended
to enforce the restraint, and that XOLAIR would most likely have been developed
absent the collaboration, I find substantial credence in this "but for" assertion.
Consequently, for the most part, the same analysis used to evaluate the effects of the
collaboration as a whole can be applied to assess the effects of the restraint, with
similar indeterminate results.

IV. CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to exemplify antitrust concerns that may arise in
R&D collaborations among competitors.
While such collaborations are often
beneficial, permitting firms to share costs, information, and expertise, there is a clear
potential for anticompetitive harm. Moreover, because these collaborations generally
occur in innovative markets, the resulting harm via suppression of innovation is
168 See FTC & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors
§ 3.2, 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH)
13, 161 (2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/jointventureguidelines.htm.

169 See Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 4-5,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); see also Transcript of Proceedings at 9, Genentech, No. 992060 (June 12, 2000).
170 See Genentech's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Contract Issues at 4-5,
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Feb. 28, 2001); see alsoTranscript of Proceedings at 9, Genentech, No. 992060 (June 12, 2000).

171 See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Breach of Contract, Breach of Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Unfair Competition and Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Genentech, No. 99-2060 (Apr. 29, 1999).

50-52,
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particularly acute. As illustrated by this article, courts should be particularly wary
of restraints imposed on collaborators which impede their activities outside of the
collaboration.
In the Tanox-Genentech-Novartis collaboration, the result indicated both a
lessening of competition and the stifling of a drug which held promise for the
treatment of peanut allergies. As discussed in Part III, the nature and purpose of
both the collaboration as a whole and the restraint against independent development
raise considerable anticompetitive concerns. As a result, although the actual effects
of the collaboration and restraint are ambiguous, given the lack of discernable procompetitive justifications and because the restraint "appears likely ... to restrict
competition," neither a detailed market inquiry nor full rule of reason analysis
should be required. 172 That is, based on the facts and aforementioned analysis, this
case seems particularly appropriate for presumptively condemning the collaboration
and the restraint against independent development under a so-called "quick look" or
173
abbreviated rule of reason.
That R&D collaborations might pose anticompetitive harm is not a radical or
novel notion. Rather, as noted by commentators during the 1998 symposium on the
suppression of technology, the real problem is assessing the likelihood and
174
magnitude of anticompetitive harm, and devising an appropriate solution.
Unfortunately, given the lack of transparency of most collaborative activities and the
unpredictable, non-linear nature of innovation in general, any such assessment is
likely to be quite difficult to say the least. Unlike price fixing in a concentrated
market of homogenous goods, harms imposed by R&D collaborations are generally
not easily predicted by microeconomics, industrial organization, or applied game
theory.
Nevertheless, how often R&D collaborations pose substantial anticompetitive
effects are, of course, relevant to creating an optimal solution. Since both federal
legislation and agency guidelines have expressed a policy of encouraging R&D
collaborations, then unless anticompetitive concerns are seen as substantial, perhaps
a case by case application of the current governing rules is the best way to address

172

A full blown market analysis is not required in a "quick look" or abbreviated rule of reason.

Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460
(1986); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Recall that market analysis
is really just a proxy for assessing the competitive effects of a restraint. Thus, there is a strong
argument that when facts demonstrate an anticompetitive nature and purpose, and defendants fail
to offer plausible, cognizable pro-competitive justifications, that no market analysis is necessary.
1:3 Of course, the parties have not had an opportunity to offer any justification. My evaluation
was based solely on the public records in the most recent litigation-a contract dispute, where no
pro-competitive justifications were required.
Assuming that the parties could proffer valid,
plausible, and legally cognizable pro-competitive justifications, a more thorough evaluation of the
anticompetitive effects will be necessary-although a full, detailed market analysis may still not be

required.

Cal. Dental Ass i, 526 U.S. at 770; Ind. Fedn of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460; Polygram

Holding, 416 F.3d at 33. Moreover, it should be noted that absent the significant evidence of
anticompetitive intent and that the restraint here was prima facie harmful (because it was imposed
on non-venture activities), the outcome of an antitrust analysis would be much different. The
limited scope of the collaborations (pertaining only to the four antibodies that were identified in the
Outline of Terms), and a thorough market analysis would in all likelihood be much more supportive
of finding the collaboration and restraint lawful.
174 Cohen & Burke, supra note 1, at 424.
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the problems. Still, given the growing importance of intellectual property in today's
modern information society and the spiraling cost of health care including
pharmaceutical drugs, perhaps a more tailored remedy is more suitable. For
instance, the National Cooperative Research and Production Cooperative Act might
be amended to provide additional guidance and safe harbors for R&D collaborations.
Alternatively, another possibility would be to enact sui generis legislation,
mandating different analysis for particularly troublesome areas such as
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, etc.
In the end, of course, the goal is to create a rule which provides greater
certainty, encourages innovation, and deters anticompetitive conduct. How this
balance is struck and whether a case by case or categorical approach is more
appropriate, remains to be determined. However, as this article has demonstrated,
given the potential for significant harm in R&D collaborations, it is my belief that
unless and until a better solution is effectuated, antitrust law can and should be
aggressively applied to examine such collaborations in order to protect consumers
and competition.

